David Ingram
Senior Member
I’m a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of York, UK. Before moving to York, I was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Centre for Philosophy of Time at the University of Milan. Primarily, my research concerns metaphysics and the philosophy of time. Recently, I’ve been thinking about the relationship between my preferred theory of time, Presentism – roughly, the view that ‘only present entities exist’ – and theories about what truth is and what propositions are. I’m sympathetic to the view that what’s true substantively depends on the world, and I think that propositions are a certain kind of structured entity. But that gets me into all sorts of trouble when defending Presentism. I’ve developed a novel version of Presentism, ‘Thisness Presentism’, which I think solves some important problems facing standard versions of Presentism. (For more on this view, see ‘The Virtues of Thisness Presentism’, Philosophical Studies, DOI: 10.1007/s11098-016-0641-3.) In general, I’m interested in the metaphysics of x for all values of x.
Recent Publications
Forthcoming “The Rotten Core of Presentism” (with J. Tallant), Synthese
2020 “A Defence of Lucretian Presentism” (with J. Tallant), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 98
2020 “Presentism and the Spans of Time” (with J. Tallant), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 101
2019 Thisness Presentism: An Essay on Time, Truth, and Ontology, Oxford: Routledge
2018 “Thisnesses, Propositions, and Truth”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 99
2018 “Presentism” (with J. Tallant), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018), ed. E.N. Zalta
2017 “Truth and Dependence” (with J. Tallant), Ergo, vol. 4
2016 “The Virtues of Thisness Presentism”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 173
2015 “Nefarious Presentism” (with J. Tallant), The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 65
