The Dynamic World
Aula 420, Department of Philosophy, University of Milan
25 and 26 May 2023
25 May
14:30-15:30 Lisa Leininger (HWS) — “The Problem of Tenseless Passage”
15:45-16:45 Daniel Deasy (University College Dublin) — “Remember that one time”
Coffee Break
17:15-18:15 Giuliano Torrengo (Milan, UAB) and Samuele Iaquinto (University of Eastern Piedmont) — “Explaining the passage, fragment by fragment”
Dinner
26 May
10.00-11:00 David Ingram (York) and Jonathan Tallant (Nottingham) — “Existence and powers in a Dynamic world”
11:15-12:15 Catharine Diehl (Leiden) — “Persistence for the Permanentist”
12:30-13:30 Yazan Freij (Milan) — “The Non-Ontological Metaphysics of Manifest Time”
Lunch
15:00-16:00 Donatella Donati (L’Aquila) and Simone Gozzano (L’Aquila) — “Dynamic all the way down”
General commentators: Elisa Paganini (Milan), Giuseppe Spolaore (Padova), Emanuele Tullio (CEU, Vienna), Alessandro Zucchi (Milano)
Organisers: Giuliano Torrengo and Dave Ingram
ABSTRACTS
Lisa Leininger
“The Problem of Tenseless Passage”
Daniel Deasy
“Remember that one time”
Some philosophers have argued that there is no time, or that even if there is time, there could be no time. In this paper, I defend the view that there must be time
Yazan Freij
“The Non-Ontological Metaphysics of Manifest Time”
I make the distinction between two broad concepts of time. One is manifest time which refers to time as experienced by us, and the other is scientific time which refers to time as it appears in our scientific theories. I then argue that the metaphysics of manifest time is best construed in a non-ontological language, and I outline some of these non-ontological theses.
David Ingram and Jonathan Tallant
“Existence and powers in a Dynamic world”
In this paper we look to achieve two ends. The first is to offer some clarificatory and defensive remarks about what we think is required of existence in a genuinely dynamic world. In doing so, we lean on work focused on Existence Presentism, connecting that to work on powers. We suggest that this combination of literatures gives us the wherewithal to differentiate a frozen world, from a dynamic world, and in the process respond to challenges that have been raised for presentism
Catharine Diehl
“Persistence for the Permanentist”
S. Iaquinto and G. Torrengo
“Explaining the passage, fragment by fragment”
We articulate a non-standard dynamic theory of time called Flow Fragmentalism. We argue that, unlike standard approaches, Flow Fragmentalism not only captures the passage of time but also provides an explanation of how it arises.
Donatella Donati and Simone Gozzano
“Dynamic all the way down”
In this paper we provide an analysis of dynamism within a dispositional framework. We argue that dynamism entails a continuous view of time, where intervals are its constitutive elements whose duration lasts as much as a certain change takes to occur. In particular, we will argue that dynamism is characterized by three features: (i) temporal extension, (ii) necessary change and (iii) time’s direction. The paper is structured in 5 sections. In the first section we set the problem: following Mumford (2009), we argue that in order to defend a dynamic view of properties, change across time cannot be considered analogous to spatial variation of properties. In the second section, we argue that a static view of change leads to paradoxes. In the third and fourth sections, we individuate the conditions for something to be dynamic. Finally, we conclude and make some remarks.