10 February 2025
The Natures of Time
Aula 402 – Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano
Aula 402 – Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano
Abstracts
Tina Röck (Dundee)
The relative concept of time and the ultimate reality of temporalities
In this contribution I will use process philosophy, phenomenology and Buddhist thought to explore the nature of time as temporality and ontological becoming. I will distinguish temporality from traditional concepts and metaphors of time (flow of time, timeline, clock time) and develop an understanding that describes temporality both as real as well plural/relational. I will argue that temporality thus understood points toward the real phenomenon, while the more traditional conceptions of ‘time’ as the subjectively experientable flow of time, measurable clock time or points organised on a timeline are rooted in conceptual interpretations, presuppositions and abstractions. ‘Real’ or ‘ultimate’ time, i.e. temporalities, are ontological unfoldings, the processes of becoming.
Francesco Orilia (Macerata)
A Dialogue on Presentism, Eternalism and Desirability
According to presentism, only what is present exists. According to eternalism, all past, present and future things exist. Hence, in presentism, although there was pain, past pain does not exist. In contrast, in eternalism, it is not only the case that there was pain; past pain exists. Moreover, given presentism, the future is open, whereas, given eternalism, the future is fixed. Thus, there is a sense in which, in deliberating situations, the presentist can feel like a free agent who could have done otherwise, whereas the eternalist cannot. And a deliberating agent is indeed free, if presentism is true, in a sense in which she is not, if eternalism is rather true. The intrinsic obnoxiousness of pain, and the recognition of a positive value for this sort of freedom, or at least a sense thereof, may lead to arguments to the effect that presentism is morally or existentially more desirable that eternalism. A dialogue between a presentist who puts forward such lines and an eternalist who tries and resist them is here construed.
Niki Young (Malta)
Time and Time Again: Revisiting the Issue of Temporality in OOO
Graham Harman’s specific version of Object-Oriented Ontology has sometimes been criticized for allegedly denying the reality of time and gradual change. In this talk, I provide a counter-argument to such critiques by offering a revaluation of Harman’s own model of time. More specifically, I seek to show that his philosophy in fact allows for an implicit object-oriented model of real time where the real object is itself caught up between its past connections and future possibilities.
Jonathan Tallant (Nottingham)
Cross time relations in a dynamic world
Putative cross-time relations are notoriously problematic for the ontology of presentism. Causation is an especially obvious and challenging case and it is causation that will occupy us here. The trouble comes to this: if we think that one event is the case of another, and at least one of the events does not exist, then seemingly we have a causal relation that connects two events, at least one of which does not exist. But, of course, a relation cannot connect an existent to a non-existent. And since causation and causal explanation are absolutely integral to our ways of thinking about and moving through the world, so this is a potentially devastating objection.
Simply, then:
1. Relations are existence-entailing.
2. Causation is a cross-time relation that connects objects at different times
Therefore,
3. Objects exist at different times
We argue that (2) is false. We do not think that causation is a relation—let alone a cross-time relation. Our argument here proceeds in two parts. In the first, we review causal discourse in order to get some feel for why it is prima facie appealing to think that causation is a relation. We argue that prima facie appearances are deceptive. Leaning on Hall, we identify two different concepts of causation: productive and counterfactual. We show that, by the dynamists lights, neither concept is one that demands a relational treatment that causes any kind of problem for those who deny the existence of past and future.
Tina Röck (Dundee)
The relative concept of time and the ultimate reality of temporalities
In this contribution I will use process philosophy, phenomenology and Buddhist thought to explore the nature of time as temporality and ontological becoming. I will distinguish temporality from traditional concepts and metaphors of time (flow of time, timeline, clock time) and develop an understanding that describes temporality both as real as well plural/relational. I will argue that temporality thus understood points toward the real phenomenon, while the more traditional conceptions of ‘time’ as the subjectively experientable flow of time, measurable clock time or points organised on a timeline are rooted in conceptual interpretations, presuppositions and abstractions. ‘Real’ or ‘ultimate’ time, i.e. temporalities, are ontological unfoldings, the processes of becoming.
Francesco Orilia (Macerata)
A Dialogue on Presentism, Eternalism and Desirability
According to presentism, only what is present exists. According to eternalism, all past, present and future things exist. Hence, in presentism, although there was pain, past pain does not exist. In contrast, in eternalism, it is not only the case that there was pain; past pain exists. Moreover, given presentism, the future is open, whereas, given eternalism, the future is fixed. Thus, there is a sense in which, in deliberating situations, the presentist can feel like a free agent who could have done otherwise, whereas the eternalist cannot. And a deliberating agent is indeed free, if presentism is true, in a sense in which she is not, if eternalism is rather true. The intrinsic obnoxiousness of pain, and the recognition of a positive value for this sort of freedom, or at least a sense thereof, may lead to arguments to the effect that presentism is morally or existentially more desirable that eternalism. A dialogue between a presentist who puts forward such lines and an eternalist who tries and resist them is here construed.
Niki Young (Malta)
Time and Time Again: Revisiting the Issue of Temporality in OOO
Graham Harman’s specific version of Object-Oriented Ontology has sometimes been criticized for allegedly denying the reality of time and gradual change. In this talk, I provide a counter-argument to such critiques by offering a revaluation of Harman’s own model of time. More specifically, I seek to show that his philosophy in fact allows for an implicit object-oriented model of real time where the real object is itself caught up between its past connections and future possibilities.
Jonathan Tallant (Nottingham)
Cross time relations in a dynamic world
Putative cross-time relations are notoriously problematic for the ontology of presentism. Causation is an especially obvious and challenging case and it is causation that will occupy us here. The trouble comes to this: if we think that one event is the case of another, and at least one of the events does not exist, then seemingly we have a causal relation that connects two events, at least one of which does not exist. But, of course, a relation cannot connect an existent to a non-existent. And since causation and causal explanation are absolutely integral to our ways of thinking about and moving through the world, so this is a potentially devastating objection.
Simply, then:
1. Relations are existence-entailing.
2. Causation is a cross-time relation that connects objects at different times
Therefore,
3. Objects exist at different times
We argue that (2) is false. We do not think that causation is a relation—let alone a cross-time relation. Our argument here proceeds in two parts. In the first, we review causal discourse in order to get some feel for why it is prima facie appealing to think that causation is a relation. We argue that prima facie appearances are deceptive. Leaning on Hall, we identify two different concepts of causation: productive and counterfactual. We show that, by the dynamists lights, neither concept is one that demands a relational treatment that causes any kind of problem for those who deny the existence of past and future.
We then argue that productive causation makes sense only given an ontology that commits to the ontological openness of the future. We conclude that eternalism cannot accommodate causation and so on the assumption that we wish to preserve the reality of causation, we should reject eternalism.